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INTRODUCTION

Craft's opening brief argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the admission of two unreliable and suggestive witness
identifications made of him by the victim of a robbery and burglary (a pretrial out
of court photo identification and an in-court identification). In addition, Craft's
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the improper
admission of an incriminating hearsay statement made by the codefendants that
placed Craft at the crime scene. Craft argues that these two instances of deficient
performance are individually and cumulatively prejudicial. Lastly, Craft's opening
brief argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated
robbery and aggravated burglary where the only evidence of these crimes was two

unreliable eyewitness identifications of Craft, an improperly admitted
codefendant hearsay statement, and an ambiguous jail phone call.
In response, the State contends that Craft has not proved deficient
performance or prejudice in either of Craft's ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, that cumulative error does not exist, and that Craft did not preserve his
insufficiency of the evidence claim, nevertheless, the evidence was sufficient to
support Craft's convictions. For the reasons set forth in the opening brief and in
this reply brief, the State is incorrect. See Utah R. App. P. 24 (c) ("Reply briefs
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief.").
ARGUMENT

I. Craft's convictions should be reversed because of the ineffective
assistance of counsel that he received and because the evidence
was insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated robbery
and aggravated burglary.
Craft's aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary convictions should be
reversed because of the ineffective assistance of counsel he received and because
the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Contrary to the State's
arguments, (1) Trial counsel's failure to object to the admissibility of the
unreliable and suggestive eyewitness identifications was objectively unreasonable
and not a strategic decision; (2) Trial counsel's failure to object to the
introduction of the hearsay statement made by the codefendants that placed Craft
at the crime scene was objectively unreasonable and not a strategic decision; (3)
Craft's insufficiency argument was preserved, properly briefed, and correct in
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pointing out that there was insufficient evidence to support Craft's aggravated
robbery and aggravated burglary convictions. See Appellee's Br. 19-53.
A. Trial Counsel's failure to challenge the admissibility of the unreliable
and suggestive eyewitness identifications was objectively unreasonable
and not a strategic decision.
Trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Craft's defense when he
failed to object to the unreliable and suggestive eyewitness identifications made
by Davis as violating Craft's due process rights under Utah Const. art. I, §7.
Applying the pertinent factors outlined in State v. Long, the pre-trial
identification of Craft did not pass constitutional muster where Davis was pistol
whipped during the incident and had only a limited view of his assailant, and
where a police officer suggested that Craft was the man in Davis' house during the
robbery prior to Davis saying so. See 721 P.2d 483,488 (Utah 1986); State v.

Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,I19, 357 P.3d 20, cert. granted, 364 P.3d 48 (Utah
2015); Utah Const. art I, §7; see also Appellant's Br. 19-31. Because the initial
identification was constitutionally unreliable, it follows that the subsequent in
court identification by Davis of Craft was also unreliable because it was tainted by
this initial problematic identification. See Appellant's Br. 22, 30.
Trial counsel's decision to call Dr. Dodd to testify about the various
problems relating to eyewitness identifications in lieu of objecting to the
admission of the constitutionally problematic eyewitness identifications was not
sound trial strategy and was objectively unreasonable. See State v. Litherland,
2000 UT 76, 119, 12 P.3d 92. Furthermore, it was not sound strategy for trial
3

counsel to give the jury a Long instruction that addressed the various issues that
can affect the accuracy of any eyewitness identification in lieu of objecting to the
admission of the constitutionally problematic eyewitness identification in the
first place. R. 245, 591, 581-82, 584, 590-92; see also Long, 721 P .2d at 487-95.
While trial counsel is not required to move for the suppression of eyewitness
identifications in every case, it is objectively unreasonable to not seek
suppression where numerous factors clearly indicate the constitutional
unreliability of any given eyewitness identification. See State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774, 778-81 (Utah 1991); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1110-11 (Utah 1994);

Cf. State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, ,I,J13- 16, 9 P.3d 777 (where this Court
determined that trial counsel had a sound strategy in not seeking to suppress the
eyewitness identifications because the identifications did not have the type of
constitutional problems as seen in Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-81 or Lopez, 886
P.2d at 1110-11).

~-

In other words, no reasonable attorney would allow the jury to hear about
constitutionally unreliable eyewitness identifications, like those that occurred in
this case, only to attack their reliability at trial. See id. That is, because of the
profound impact and influence that eyewitness identifications have on the jury, it
is imperative to exclude unconstitutional eyewitness identifications altogether
rather than seek to lessen their prejudicial impact on the jury. See State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991) (pointing out the "great weight [that]
jurors are likely to give eyewitness testimony.") (internal quotations and citations
4

omitted); see also State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ,r15, 223 P.3d 1103 (stating that
"juries seemed to be swayed the most by the confidence of an eyewitness.").
Simply put, it is impossible to sufficiently 'unring the bell' of the prejudicial
impact of an unconstitutional identification by trying to attack it after the jury
has witnessed it. Thus, contrary to the State's claims, it was not reasonable trial
strategy for Craft's counsel to not object to the introduction of the constitutionally
unreliable eyewitness identifications because of the special importance that
jurors place on this type of evidence. See Appellee's Br. 22-33
In addition, contrary to the State's argument, the record in this case
supports that the eyewitness identifications did not pass constitutional muster
and that trial counsel performed deficiently in not objecting to them. See
Appellee's Br. 23; see also Utah R. App. P. 23B; State v. Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ,I9,
318 P .3d 1164 ("A [rule 23B] remand is not necessary if the facts underlying the
ineffectiveness claim are contained in the existing record."). Here, the record
clearly shows that Davis never had an opportunity to directly view the robbers in
his house, without obstruction, for a lengthy period of time, and with good
lighting. R. 400-01, 405, 412-17. During the few minutes when one of the men
had removed his mask, Davis was face down on the carpet in a "sacrificial
position[,]" so he could only see the maskless man in his "peripheral vision." R.
400-01,412-15. He was also in a continued heightened level of stress as he was
held at gunpoint and was hit and pistol whipped, leaving his "whole face []
bloody." R. 395, 398-99, 400-01, 412-14, 429. Davis's attention was also
5

distracted by his concern for his mother and the fact that there were three, not
just one, uninvited men in his house. R.401, 404, 415-416, 429.
In addition, the length of time between the incident and the initial
identification of Craft, disputed as being as little as seven up to forty-eight hours,
underscores the unreliability of the identification. R.421,434-35,531,544;

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783; See Appellant's Br. 26. And, Detective Torres failed to
follow a number of safe-guard procedures for ensuring that any eyewitness
identification made by Davis would be constitutionally reliable. See Appellant's
Br. 14. Detective Torres also impermissibly suggested that Davis choose Craft's
photo when Torres asked Davis if Craft was the man that he saw in his house
during the burglary after Davis said that Craft "looked familiar." R. 546. Thus,
because the record is clear that the eyewitness identifications did not pass
constitutional muster, and the record also shows that at no time did trial counsel
object to these identifications, the State is mistaken in arguing that Craft cannot
prove trial counsel's deficient performance on this record. See Appellee's Br. 23.
The State is also mistaken in arguing that trial counsel's deficient
performance did not prejudice his defense. See Appellee's Br. 33. That is, apart
from the problematic eyewitness identifications, there was a dearth of evidence to
support that Craft was one of the three men involved in the robbery and burglary
at Davis and Kirby's residence R. 394. Neither Craft's fingerprints nor DNA were
found on any of the recovered stolen items. R. 547-548. The vehicle that was
searched next to trailer 14 did not belong to Craft. R. 453, 458, 547, 612. In
6

addition, the ambiguous phone call made from the jail did not contain any
incriminating statements and did not place Craft at the scene of the crime. Thus,
had the problematic identifications been objected to and excluded from trial,
there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Craft. 1
B. Trial Counsel's failure to object to the introduction of the hearsay
statement made by the codefendants that placed Craft at the crime
scene was objectively unreasonable and not a strategic decision.
The State is mistaken in arguing that trial counsel's performance was not
prejudicially deficient when counsel failed to object and ask for a mistrial after
Detective Torres introduced a nontestifying co-defendant hearsay statement that
placed Craft at the scene of the crime, thus depriving Craft of his Sixth
Amendment right to confront his accusers. See Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 42 (2004); see also R. 551-52 (where Detective Torres responds to the
prosecutor's questions about how the pictures for the photo identification were
chosen by saying, "As far as the other two defendants saying he was there.")
(emphasis added); see also Appellee's Br.23. Furthermore, because the

The State is correct in pointing out that this Court applies the reasonable
likelihood prejudice standard in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. See Appellee's Br. 21; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
689 (1984). Craft has demonstrated that, in applying this standard, his trial
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Appellant's Br. 31-32,
35-37. Furthermore, the gravity of trial counsel's deficient performance is
highlighted by the fact that had trial counsel properly objected to the admission
of the eyewitness identifications and introduction of the improper hearsay
statement, the trial court's admission of these would be reviewed under the
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt prejudice standard. See State v. Lujan, 2015
UT App 199, ,I16; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); see also
Appellant's Br. 30-32, 35-37.
1
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codefendant hearsay statement was both improper and inflammatory, trial
counsel's failures to object to the statement and move for a mistrial were
objectively deficient and not sound trial strategy. See State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT
70, ,I26, 321 P.3d 1136; State v. King, 2012 UT App 203, ,I14, 283 P.3d 980. 2
The State argues that Craft cannot establish deficient performance because
trial counsel's decision to not object to the statement and to not move for a
mistrial was a strategic determination to not draw unwarranted attention to the
statement. See Appellee's Br. 40. The State also argues that trial counsel did not
move for a mistrial because he made a strategic decision that the trial court would
have likely not granted the motion. Id. at 42. However, the State is mistaken
because it is not a strategic decision to not object to a hearsay statement when it
is as inflammatory and improper as the statement at issue in this case. See State

v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,28 (stating that "given the improper and
inflammatory nature of the prosecutor's remarks, it was not reasonable for
defense counsel to stand silent."). In other words, no reasonable attorney would
fail to object to the incriminating hearsay statement made by the codefendants
where the defendant is precluded from his constitutional right to cross-examine
the statement, and the statement places the defendant at the crime scene, but the
Contrary to the State's argument, a rule 23B remand was not necessary to
decide Craft's ineffective of assistance of counsel claim as the record is clear that
Detective Torres introduced the improper co-defendant hearsay statement and
that defense counsel did not object to the statement. Furthermore, trial counsel's
failure to object and ask for a mistrial was objectively unreasonable and not
sound strategy. See Appellee's Br.39; see also Utah R. App. P. 23B; State v. Lee,
2014 UT App 4, ,r9, 318 P.3d 1164.
2
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physical evidence in the case does not. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. See also

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
Furthermore, had defense counsel objected to the inflammatory and
improper co-defendant hearsay statement and moved for a mistrial, the trial
judge would have likely granted trial counsel's motion. Even though the
prosecutor did not draw attention to the statement after it was offered by
Detective Torres, the single utterance of the statement was extremely damaging
and not innocuous because it unreliably placed Craft at the crime scene and Craft
was not able to cross-examine this statement at trial. Cf. State v. Duran, 2011 UT
App 254, ,I34, 262 P.3d 468 (In the context of a prosecutor giving improper
remarks at trial, "a mistrial is not required where an improper statement is not
intentionally elicited, is made in passing, and is relatively innocuous in light of
all the testimony presented.") (emphasis added) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
There is also a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted
Craft if the improper codefendant statement had not been introduced at trial. See

State v. Greuber, 2007 UT 50, ,rg, 165 P .3d 1185. That is, apart from the
improper, inflammatory, and unreliable hearsay statement, there was no reliable
evidence that placed Craft at the crime scene. See Appellant's Br. 31, 36.
Moreover, even if the two instances of deficient performance identified supra are
not individually prejudicial, they are cumulatively prejudicial. See Appellant's Br.
37-38.
9

C. Trial Counsel's insufficiency argument was preserved, properly briefed,
and correct in pointing out that there was insufficient evidence to
support the convictions in this case.
Contrary to the State's claim, trial counsel preserved the insufficiency of
the evidence claim that the evidence did not support Craft's convictions for
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. See Appellee's Br. 45; R. 558. Here,
trial counsel made a timely directed verdict motion at the close of the State's
evidence, and the trial judge's response to counsel reflects an understanding that
counsel objected to the sufficiency of the evidence when he responded with "Mr.
Davis testified and identified [Craft] as the person being there. That is enough
[evidence] to take it to the jury, to allow reasonable minds to consider whether or
not to find him guilty" R. 558 (emphasis added); see also State v. Seale, 853 P.2d
862, 874 (Utah 1993) (stating that "[a]lthough [trial counsel's] objection was
vague, the judge clearly understood it when he ruled that the statement was
admissible ... [and] trial counsel [can] forego explaining his or her grounds for
objection if the specific ground is apparent from the context, which it obviously
must have been.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
But in the event that this Court decides that counsel did not preserve the
insufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court can reach this issue under the plain
error doctrine, an argument sufficiently briefed in Craft's opening brief. See State

v. Mohamed, 2012 UT App 183, ,I3, 282 P.3d 1066. See also Appellant's Br. 3848. That is, in applying State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1984), United

States v. Bonner, 648 F.3d 209, 214-216 (4th Cir.), State v. Martinez, 2002 UT
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App 126, ,I,I44-47, 47 P.3d 115, and State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246,247 (Utah
1985), there was insufficient evidence to support Craft's convictions for
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary where there was no reliable evidence
to place Craft at the crime scene. See Appellant's Br. 46-47. Here, Craft was not in
possession of stolen items and none of his fingerprints nor DNA evidence was
found at the crime scene. Id. see also R.476,465,548, 551. In addition, the wellestablished and abundant case law on this issue should have made the
insufficiency in this case obvious and fundamental to the trial court. See State v.

Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I17, 10 P.3d 346); see also Appellant's Br. 38-48. Thus,
contrary to the State's claim, a plain error analysis shows that there was
insufficient evidence to support Craft's convictions for aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary, that the error should have been obvious to the trial court,
and that Craft was prejudiced by the error because he now has two first degree
felony convictions where the evidence failed to sufficiently place him at the crime
scene.

11

CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above and in the opening brief, Craft respectfully
asks this Court to reverse and remand 'With an order of dismissal because the
evidence was insufficient. Alternatively, Craft asks this Court to reverse and
remand for a new trial because of the improperly admitted evidence regarding
the unreliable eye-witness identifications and the improper codefendant hearsay
statement.
SUBMITTED this

3 0~

day of June, 2016.

TERESA L. WELCH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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